Attorney misfeasance surfaced in the succeeding unit, on statutory construction. In United States v. Baum, 9 a criminal defense attorney concocted a plan to try to win a reduction for his already-sentenced client, in which a former client would lure a suspected drug dealer to the United States (in exchange for some money from the current client), but Baum would get this cooperation credited to the current client by lying to the government about the relationship between his two clients (that they were close friends) and about the money. 10 When this scheme blew up (because the current client decided instead to cooperate with the government in its investigation of the lawyer), Baum was charged with obstruction of justice.
11 Baum countered that because the current client had already been sentenced, there had been no "pending proceeding" -a requirement case law had read into the federal obstruction of justice statute 12 -but District Judge Denny Chin (since promoted to the Second Circuit) read the requirement broadly. Specifically, "[c]orrupt attorneys pose a grave threat to our adversarial system of justice." 13 In addition to illustrating that policy considerations sometimes push judges to construe criminal statutes broadly, 14 Baum thus also portrays attorney behavior that students need to be warned against.
In teaching possession, I mentioned in passing Schalk v. State, 15 the prosecution of a criminal defense lawyer who arranged a drug buy from a police confidential informant in order to discredit the informant, who was an integral part of the case against one of Schalk's clients. 16 The courts rejected Schalk's many variations on the theme of innocent possession, a concept that has been recognized in other contexts. 17 Another lawyer prosecution given brief attention, in the unit on mens rea, is United States v. Flores found to be money laundering. 19 With the assistance of the client's testimony, the government was able to convict Flores of conspiracy to commit money laundering on a willful blindness theory.
20
Flores could also have been used in the unit on conspiracy, but instead I noted a similar case, United States v. Sharpe, 21 where willful blindness was used to convict a lawyer who managed the proceeds of his client's fraud and let a coconspirator use the lawyer's office in furtherance of the fraud. 22 Sharpe can profitably be contrasted with Vinluan v. Doyle, 23 in which the appellate court enjoined the conspiracy prosecution of an attorney for advising his clients, nurses in a contract dispute with their nursing home employer, that they could resign en masse. 24 The prosecution charged a conspiracy to endanger some of the patients at the nursing home, specifically, chronically ill children on ventilators.
25 While such endangerment was certainly foreseeable to the lawyer, the appellate court prevented his prosecution because "it would eviscerate the right to give and receive legal counsel with respect to potential criminal liability if an attorney could be charged with conspiracy . . . whenever a District Attorney disagreed with that advice."
26
So policy reasons overcame any application of willful blindness or of any other version of the mens rea necessary for conspiracy.
Supplementing these lawyer defendant cases were a few cases involving much paler forms of lawyer misconduct. Prosecutors frequently err in stating the burden of persuasion to the jury. 27 One flamboyant example involved a PowerPoint presentation:
The A final instance of lawyer misconduct arose when I taught duress. In situations of arguable duress, the prosecution occasionally seeks to convict both the threatener and the threatened, in separate proceedings of course. 32 This may cause the state to take inconsistent positions regarding the influence of the threatener, as was the case in the separate homicide prosecutions of Deidre Hunt and her abusive boyfriend Konstantinos Fotopoulos. 33 Hunt, the shooter, was the second to be prosecuted; her lawyer quoted the prosecution's statements in Fotopoulos' trial about his "clear pattern of physical assault, abuse, intimidation, and coercion --. . . the direct and primary cause of Deidre Hunt's criminal activity."
34 But the trial court refused to instruct Hunt's jury on duress, and the appellate court agreed, because "duress is not a defense to homicide."
35 So the case not only illustrates that hoary rule of duress law, but also instances what two justices of the state supreme court, writing in Fotopoulos' appeal, considered a clear violation of due process: "[I]t is repugnant to the tenets of due process and fundamental fairness that the State would purposefully present differing renditions of the same factual scenario during separate proceedings, simply to obtain a particular result against codefendants. like these, and the others in this part, show that a professor can raise important ethical issues while teaching the basic rules of criminal law.
* * *
Theft law provides a particularly rich environment for examining lawyer ethics. Combining normal human avarice with the many opportunities attorneys have to separate others from their property produces a wealth of examples of criminal, or at least unethical, conduct.
The bottom line of my class on theft was that the complexity of the "common law" offenses has caused many jurisdictions to adopt remarkably broad consolidated theft statutes. To show the charging difficulties created by the old law of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses -as discussed in Joshua Dressler's chapter on theft in Understanding Criminal Law, 37 portions of which were assigned for reading -I usually gave the students a streamlined version of Graham v. United States. 38 For example, A, a criminal lawyer, induces his client to give the lawyer $2,200, telling the client that $2,000 of this money is necessary to bribe a police officer into dropping the charges against the defendant. The officer drops the charges after talking to the lawyer, who keeps all the money. If you were the prosecutor under the old law of theft, with which crime would you charge A?
Most students would opt for larceny by trick, on the theory that A accepted the $2,000 with the intent to defraud the client. 39 But this charge would be vulnerable to the contention that A decided to keep all the money only while talking to the officer, in which case the crime could only be embezzlement. 40 One could even contend that title to the $2,000 passed to the attorney at that time (as title to the $200 fee surely did), as payment for services legal and illegal, which would make A guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses. 41 Conversely, if the court deemed A's false promise to bribe the officer a promise of future conduct, A would be guilty of neither larceny, embezzlement, nor false pretenses. 42 The point of the exercise was not to teach the distinctions between the "common law" theft offenses, but to demonstrate the need for reform through another instance of lawyer misconduct. 43 While some American jurisdictions took the Model Penal Code's more measured approach to reforming the theft offenses (codifying each of the former crimes but granting 37 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 543-65 (6th ed. 2012). 38 187 F. 2d 87, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1950), discussed in DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 562. 39 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 550. The court in Graham accepted this reasoning. See 187 F.2d at 88-89. 40 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 560-61. The defendant in Graham unsuccessfully argued that the trial judge's charge to the jury did not sufficiently distinguish larceny from embezzlement. 187 F.2d at 89-90. 41 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 561-64. Graham's primary contention was that the prosecution should have charged him with obtaining property by false pretenses. See 187 F.2d at 88. 42 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 564. 43 A more recent lawyer case, Durie v. State, can be used to make the same point. 751 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Durie, a plaintiff's attorney representing two men injured in a bar fight, attempted to avoid a Medicaid lien on the amount recovered by one of his clients, by telling the insurance company that only 0.5% of the $100,000 coming from the bar's liability insurance policy would be going to the client with the Medicaid lien, when in actuality that client was slated to receive 80% of the money. Id. Larceny (and of whom)? Embezzlement? Obtaining property by false pretenses? None of the above? Another example is Winters v. Mulholland, in which a disgruntled 15-year associate copied and stored some client files without authorization from his firm, and through an accomplice, tampered with client contact data in the firm's computer system. Upon leaving the firm, the associate took client files with him and lied to some of those clients about the firm's ability to continue to represent them. 33 So. 3d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Which "common law" theft offense is the taking of the files? Are the associate's other actions any form of theft? [Vol. 4 the court the right to conform the charge to the proof at trial), 44 others have chosen to create a single consolidated crime, usually denominated theft. 45 Florida's theft statute is on such law, modeled on a proposal by Professor G. Robert Blakey and a coauthor.
46 I usually walked the students through its remarkably broad provisions:
A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. (b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.
47
Breadth continues in the statute's definition of key terms. "'Property' means anything of value," including "services," which are defined as "anything of value resulting from a person's physical or mental labor or skill" 48 ; "property of another" is defined to include property in which the defendant "has an interest" as long as someone else has an interest in the property upon which the defendant "is not privileged to infringe without consent."
49 But the broadest provision of all is the definition of "obtains or uses":
[ To better understand the comprehensiveness of this statute and to return to the theme of ethical conduct, the students were required to prepare oral answers to three hypotheticals: 1) X, a lawyer, holds a client's retainer in a trust account. Unable to meet payroll one month, the lawyer takes money from the trust account for this purpose (in violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct), intending to put it back into the trust account within a month. Is X guilty of theft under Florida's theft statute? Why or why not? 2) Y, an upper-class law student authorized to use a computer legal research program, but for educational purposes only, uses the program for compensated research for a local lawyer for whom the lawyer is clerking. Is Y guilty of theft under Florida's theft statute? Why or why not? 3) Z, a first year law student taking an exam, copies from the student sitting next to him the answers to several multiple choice questions, without that student's knowledge. Is Z guilty of theft under Florida's theft statute? Why or why not?
Most students had little problem with the first hypothetical. X, whose actions would at the least jeopardize his license to practice law, also made an unauthorized use of the money. 52 Even though he had a trustee's interest in the money, the client also had an interest on which the lawyer was not privileged to infringe. He might not have an intent to deprive the client of any benefit from the property (as Florida is an IOTA state, with the interest on most trust accounts going to a charitable fund that among other things provides grants to law schools 53 ), X does intend to temporarily appropriate the property to his own use.
54
Usually only a few students failed to see the guilt of Y (whose actions also would violate her law school's contract with Westlaw or Lexis and thus risk suspension of that contract, triggering serious consequences for her law school and her 55 ). She knowingly made unauthorized use of a service -the definition of which includes "[p]rivate . . . communication . . . services," 56 and she intended both to deprive the company providing the computer research program of the fees her employer would otherwise have had to pay, and to appropriate the computer service to the use of another.
While acknowledging that Z has violated his law school's honor code, some students typically balked at criminal liability for him. Z knowingly made unauthorized use of the other student's answers, they would say, but are those answers property? Well, yes, if property includes services and services are defined as "anything of value resulting from a person's . . . mental labor or skill." 57 But, they would follow up, doesn't their value 52 Note that the statute does not even require an unauthorized use, but that seems the only sensible way to read its language. depend on whether the answers are correct? Not under the statute's definition of value, which refers to "market value . . . at the time and place of the event." 58 They would finally complain, Z had no intent to deprive the other student of the value of her answer, as she would get credit (or not) regardless of Z's answer. At this point, other students who understood the curving of grades would begin to howl, while the calmer members of the class would point out that in any event Z did have the intent to appropriate the answers to her own use.
I would usually finish the class by pointing out that prosecution of persons like X, Y, and Z are exceedingly rare; it is not the language of the statute that prohibits them, but prosecutorial discretion. 59 Fear of the courts' reaction to a prosecutor's pushing the edges of the theft envelope, by strictly construing the statute or raising anew the question of its vagueness, may explain some of this reticence. In addition to striking these by now familiar chords, and teaching the tedious process of applying the elements of a criminal statute to particular facts, this class also reminded students of the ethical burdens they already bear and of greater ones in their future.
Short's mistaken belief in consent be a defense if Short were charged with assault with intent to rape at common law (the actual case)? If Short were charged with rape at common law (assuming contrary to the actual case that penetration did occur)? If Short were charged with rape under the Model Penal Code (again assuming penetration)? Discussing the last hypothetical, I drew out the answer that his mistake would be a defense if it negated the consciousness of risk necessary for recklessness, the minimum required culpability for rape under the Code, 68 at the end of which I said something careless like, "What would you say to your client?" The naïve reply I got from a very good student was, "I would tell Short to say that it never occurred to him that Tomobe was not consenting to his actions." I knew in a flash that I had to include a class on the ethical perils of client perjury.
I would set up that class by asking the students to prepare an answer to a somewhat more careful version of my client advice question, 69 but I also required them to read the relevant portions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 70 as well as an excerpted version of "Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions" 71 before answering. Thus primed, I began the class by cautioning the students not to follow what I consider natural human behavior -to be as helpful to the client as possible, by telling him about the legal significance of his lack of consciousness of the risk of non-consent. Both ethical considerations and the law regarding subornation of perjury require criminal defense attorneys to behave in a much less straightforward way.
To illustrate the point, I showed clips from Otto Preminger's great trial film Anatomy of a Murder.
72 First, the discussion between the defense attorney (James Stewart) and his disbarred friend (Arthur O'Connell) about their prospective client (Ben Gazzara), an Air Force officer accused of murdering the man who had allegedly raped the officer's wife (Lee Remick) some hours before the killing. In the discussion the friend suggests that the lawyer give his client "a chance" to find a defense by describing the relevant law to him. Second, a subsequent discussion with the would-be client, in which the lawyer nudges 73 the client toward facts that would support an insanity plea (punctuated by the client's hilarious question, "Am I getting warmer?"). Third, a later brief conference in 68 See MODEL PENAL CODE § § 2.02(3), 2.04(1(a), 213(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 69 which the now well-schooled client describes his irresistible-impulse state of mind, causing the lawyer to (finally) accept his case.
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Film almost always captures the students' attention, and the novelty of a rather grainy black-and-white video helps. Turning the students to a discussion of Freedman's article, I began with a basic question -if a criminal trial is a search for truth, what obligation does the defendant have to participate in that search? The answer Freedman provides is clear. None at all. 75 If even a guilty defendant has the right to force the state to prove her guilt, the defense lawyer's duty of competent representation requires a zealous challenge to that proof. 76 This makes the answer to Freedman's first "hard" question rather easy. It is "proper to cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting the reliability or credibility of an adverse witness whom you know to be telling the truth."
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The defendant's sole obligation to the search for truth in a criminal trial is not to commit perjury. 78 Not only may the client be guilty, but anyone who counsels the client to commit perjury, including her defense attorney, may be prosecuted for subornation of perjury. 79 The natural-human-behavior response in advising a client like Short, as well as my good student's naïve response to my careless question, could be a path to prison. Having made this point, I shifted to Freedman's more complicated issue, the problem of the criminal defense attorney who merely knows, rather than suggests, that his client (or some other defense witness) is about to commit perjury. 80 In 1966, Freedman argued that a defense lawyer who knows 81 a witness is committing perjury should not suffer ethical punishment for calling that witness and questioning her like any other witness. 82 He reasoned that the duty of maintaining client confidentiality requires this conduct 83 because the knowledge that perjury is being committed almost always comes from a confidential disclosure by the client. 84 For even making this radical suggestion (in a speech to some members of the District of Columbia 74 ANATOMY OF A MURDER, supra note 72. 75 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1471. 76 . 78 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1471. 79 See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 69-79 (3d ed. 1999). As a few previous examples indicate, prosecutors seem especially interested in going after defense attorneys, even to the point of making plea deals with the client in exchange for testimony against the defense attorney. See also supra text accompanying notes 11 & 20. 80 "Is it proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will commit perjury?" Freedman, supra note 71, at 1469. 81 Freedman rightly rejects the "how can you ever really know anything?" copout that some defense lawyers use. See id. at 1472. Interest in the mysteries of epistemology is not a common trait among a very practical lot of criminal defense attorneys, so its popping up at this point raises doubts. 86 That rule and its comments outline a three-step process for the lawyer who knows of potential perjury. 87 First the lawyer should remonstrate 88 with the potential witness about the impropriety and danger of committing perjury, 89 including the likelihood of being exposed by a prosecutor well trained in the art of cross-examination. 90 If the remonstration fails, the lawyer should seek to withdraw from the case, 91 though as Freedman notes judges are usually quite unwilling (for reasons both practical and ethical) to allow lawyers, especially appointed lawyers, to take this second step. 92 If withdrawal is not a possibility, the lawyer faces disclosure of the perjury to the court. 93 In the words of the official commentary to rule 3.3, "The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury." 94 So lawyers seek at all costs to avoid the knowledge of client perjury that will place them at the top of rule 3.3's three-step slippery slope, and thus behave like the defense attorney in Anatomy of a Murder, who advised the client about the law before hearing his version of the facts. This tactic raises the third of Freedman's hard questions: "Is it proper to give your client legal advice when you have reason to believe that the knowledge you give him will tempt him to commit perjury?" 95 different ethical rules that apply to prosecutors. 109 I would end the class by using this asymmetry in the professional responsibilities of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys as another example of the bias for liberty in American criminal law. 110 I have never taught the Professional Responsibility course nor do I pretend to be an expert in any of its topics. 111 However, I did feel the obligation as a teacher of Criminal Law to at least alert future lawyers about the ethical issues they do and will confront. Cases and hypotheticals involving wayward lawyers, especially in the area of theft, and the foregoing brief foray into the problem of client perjury were my ways of trying to meet this obligation.
